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Abstract
Abstraction is one of the most important strategies for dealing with the state space
explosion problem in model checking. In the abstract model, the state space is
largely reduced, however, a counterexample found in such a model may not be a
real counterexample in the concrete model. Accordingly, the abstract model needs
to be further refined. How to check whether or not a reported counterexample is
spurious is a key problem in the abstraction-refinement loop. In this paper, a
formal definition for spurious path is given. Based on it, efficient algorithms for
detecting spurious counterexamples are proposed.
Key words: model checking, formal verification, abstraction, refinement,
algorithm.
1. Introduction
Model checking is an important approach for the verification of hardware,
software, multi-agent systems, communication protocols, embedded systems and
so forth. The term model checking was coined by Clarke and Emerson [1], as well
as Sifakis and Queille [2], independently. The earlier model checking algorithms
explicitly enumerated the reachable states of the system in order to check the cor-
rectness of a given specification. This restricted the capacity of model checkers to
systems with a few million states. Since the number of states can grow exponen-
tially in the number of variables, early implementations were only able to handle
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small designs and did not scale to examples with industrial complexity. To com-
bat this, kinds of methods, such as abstraction, partial order reduction, OBDD,
symmetry and bound technique are applied to model checking to reduce the state
space for efficient verification. Thanks to these efforts, model checking has been
one of the most successful verification approaches which is widely adopted in
industrial community.
Among the techniques for reducing the state space, abstraction is certainly
the most important one. Abstraction technique preserves all the behaviors of the
concrete system but may introduce behaviors that are not present originally. Thus,
if a property (i.e. a temporal logic formula) is satisfied in the abstract model, it
will still be satisfied in the concrete model. However, if a property is unsatisfiable
in the abstract model, it may still be satisfied in the concrete model, and none of
the behaviors that violate the property in the abstract model can be reproduced
in the concrete model. In this case, the counterexample is said to be spurious.
Thus, when a spurious counterexample is found, the abstraction should be refined
in order to eliminate the spurious behaviors. This process is repeated until either
a real counterexample is found or the abstract model satisfies the property.
In the abstraction-refinement loop, how to check whether or not a reported
counterexample is spurious is a key problem. In [3], algorithm SplitPath is pre-
sented for checking whether or not a counterexample is spurious, and a SAT solver
is employed to implement it [4, 10]. In SplitPath, whether or not a counterexam-
ple is spurious can be checked by detecting the first failure state in the counterex-
ample. If a failure state is found, the counterexample is spurious, otherwise, the
counterexample is a real one. However, whether or not a state, say sˆi, is a failure
state relies on the prefix of the counterexample sˆ0, sˆ1, ..., sˆi. This brings in a poly-
nomial number of unwinding of the loop in an infinite counterexample [3, 15].
In this paper, based on a formal definition of failure states, spurious paths
are re-analyzed, and a new approach for checking spurious counterexamples is
proposed. Within this approach, whether or not a counterexample is spurious
still depends on the existence of failure states in the counterexample. Instead
of the prefix, to checking whether or not a state sˆi is a failure state is only up
to sˆi’s pre- and post- states in the counterexample. Based on this, for an infinite
counterexample, the polynomial number of unwinding of the loop can be avoided.
Further, the algorithm can be easily improved by detecting the heaviest failure
state such that a number of model checking iterations can be saved in the whole
abstract-refinement loop. In addition, the algorithm can be naturally parallelled.
The rest parts of the paper are organized as follows. The next section briefly
presents the preliminaries in abstraction-refinement. In section 3, why spurious
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counterexamples occur is analyzed intuitively and algorithm SplitPath is briefly
presented. In section 4, a formal definition of spurious counterexamples is given
with respect to the formal definition of failure states. Further, in section 5, efficient
algorithms for checking whether or not a counterexample in the abstract model is
spurious are presented. Finally, conclusions are drawn in section 6.
2. Abstraction and Refinement
There are many techniques for obtaining the abstract models [6, 8, 12]. We
follow the counterexample guided abstraction and refinement method proposed by
Clarke, etc, where abstraction is performed by selecting a set of variables which
are insensitive to the desired property to be invisible [4]. We use h : S → ˆS to
denote an abstract function, where S is the set of all states in the original model,
and ˆS the set of all states in the abstract model. For clearance, s, s1, s2, ... are
usually used to denote the states in the original model, and sˆ, sˆ1, sˆ2, ... indicate
the states in the abstract model. Further, for a state sˆ in the abstract model, h−(sˆ)
is used to denote the set of origins of sˆ in the original model.
The abstraction-refinement loop is depicted in Fig.1. Initially, the abstract
Abstract h Model Checker
¬P
M M
′ No errors
Counterexample
Check Spurious
Real counterexampleSpurious
Refinement
M
′′
Figure 1: Abstraction refinement loop
model M′ is obtained by the abstract function h. Then a model checker is em-
ployed to check whether or not the abstract model satisfies the desired property. If
no errors are found, the model is correct. Otherwise, a counterexample is reported
and rechecked by a checker which is used to check whether or not a counterexam-
ple is spurious. If the counterexample is not spurious, it will be a real counterex-
ample that violates the system; otherwise, the counterexample is spurious, and a
refining tool is used to refine the abstract model [3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 13]. Subsequently,
the refined abstract model is checked with the model checker again until either a
real counterexample is found or the model is checked to be correct. In this paper,
we concentrate on the how to check whether or not a counterexample is spurious.
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3. Spurious Paths
To check a spurious counterexample efficiently, we first show why spurious
paths occur intuitively with an example. Then we briefly present the basic idea
of algorithm SplitPath which is used in [3, 15] for checking whether or not a
counterexample is spurious.
3.1. Why Spurious Paths?
Abstraction technique preserves all the behaviors of the concrete system but
may introduce behaviors that are not present originally. Therefore, when imple-
menting the model checker with the abstract model, some reported counterexam-
ples will not be real counterexamples that violate the desired property. This is
intuitively illustrated by the traffic lights controller example [3].
Example 1. For the traffic light controller in Fig. 2 (1), by making variable color
invisible, an abstract model can be obtained as shown in Fig. 2 (2). We want to
prove ^(state = stop) (any time, the state of the light will be stop sometimes
in the future). By implementing model checking with the abstract model, a coun-
color = red
state = stop
color = yellow
state = go
color = green
state = go
state = stop
state = go
Original model Abstract model
s1
s2
s3
sˆ1
sˆ2
Figure 2: Traffic Light Controller
terexample, sˆ1, sˆ2, sˆ2, sˆ2, ...will be reported. However, in the concrete model, such
a behavior cannot be found. So, this is not a real counterexample. 
3.2. Detecting Spurious Counterexample with SplitPath
In [3], algorithms SplitPath is presented for checking whether or not a finite
counterexample is spurious. In SplitPath, as illustrated in Fig.3, initially, the set,
M0, of starting states falling into h−(sˆ0),
M0 = I ∩ h−(sˆ0)
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is computed. Then for the image of the states in I ∩ h−(sˆ0), i.e. R(I ∩ h−(sˆ0)), the
set of states falling into h−(sˆ1),
M1 = M0 ∩ h−(sˆ1) = R(I ∩ h−(sˆ1)) ∩ h−(sˆ2)
is computed. Generally, for any i ≥ 1,
Mi = R(Mi−1) ∩ h−(sˆi)
= R(R(Mi−2) ∩ h−( ˆsi−1)) ∩ h−(sˆi)
= R(R(R(Mi−1) ∩ h−(sˆi)) ∩ h−( ˆsi−1)) ∩ h−(sˆi)
= ...
= R(R(...(I ∩ h−(sˆ1)) ∩ ... ∩ h−( ˆsi−1)) ∩ h−(sˆi)
is computed recursively. For some state sˆk, k ≥ 1, if Mk = ∅, ˆsk−1 is a failure
state. Note that if M0 = ∅, sˆ0 is a failure state. To check whether or not a finite
counterexample is spurious, M0, M1, M2, ... are computed in turn until the first
state sˆk where Mk = ∅ is found, or the last state in the counterexample is reached.
sˆ0 sˆ1 sˆ2 sˆ3 sˆ4
Figure 3: Algorithm SplitPath
For infinite counterexamples, it is more complicated to be dealt with since the
last state in the counterexample can never be reached. Thus, a polynomial number
of unwinding of the loop in the counterexample is needed [3]. That is an infinite
counterexample can be reduced to a finite counterexample by unwinding the loop
for a polynomial number of times. Accordingly, SplitPath can be used again to
check whether or not this infinite counterexample is spurious.
4. Failure States and Spurious Counterexamples
In [4, 5], a spurious counterexample is informally defined by: a counterex-
ample in the abstract model which does not exist in the concrete model. In this
section, we give a formal definition for spurious counterexamples based on the the
formal definition of failure states.
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To this end, In0
sˆi
, In1
sˆi
, ..., Inn
sˆi
and Insˆi are defined first:
In0
sˆi
= {s | s ∈ h−(sˆi), s′ ∈ h−( ˆsi−1) and (s′, s) ∈ R}
In1sˆi = {s | s ∈ h
−(sˆi), s′ ∈ In0sˆi and (s′, s) ∈ R}
...
Inn
sˆi
= {s | s ∈ h−(sˆi), s′ ∈ Inn−1sˆi and (s′, s) ∈ R}
...
Insˆi =
∞⋃
i=0
Ini
sˆi
Clearly, In0
sˆi
denotes the set of states in h−(sˆi) with inputting edges from the states
in h−( ˆsi−1), and In1sˆi stands for the set of states in h−(sˆi) with inputting edges from
the states in In0
sˆi
, and In2sˆi means the set of states in h
−(sˆi) with inputting edges
from the states in In1
sˆi
, and so on. Thus, Insˆi denotes the set of states in h−(sˆi) that
are reachable from some state in h−( ˆsi−1) as illustrated in the lower gray part in
Fig. 4. Note that there must exist a natural number n, such that
n+1⋃
i=0
Ini
sˆi
=
n⋃
i=0
Ini
sˆi
since h−(sˆi) is finite. Note that for state sˆ0,
In0
sˆ0
= {s | s ∈ (h−(sˆ0) ∩ I)}
In1
sˆ0
= {s | s ∈ h−(sˆ0), s′ ∈ In0sˆ0 and (s′, s) ∈ R}
...
That is only In0
sˆ0
is defined differently since there are no pre states.
Figure 4: In sˆi and Outsˆi
Similarly, Out0
sˆi
, Out1sˆi , ..., Out
n
sˆi
and Outsˆi can also be defined.
Out0
sˆi
= {s | s ∈ h−(sˆi), s′ ∈ h−( ˆsi+1) and (s, s′) ∈ R}
Out1sˆi = {s | s ∈ h
−(sˆi), s′ ∈ Out0sˆi and (s, s′) ∈ R}
...
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Outn
sˆi
= {s | s ∈ h−(sˆi), s′ ∈ Outn−1sˆi and (s, s′) ∈ R}
...
Outsˆi =
∞⋃
i=0
Outi
sˆi
Where Out0
sˆi
denotes the set of states in h−(sˆi) with outputting edges to the states
in h−( ˆsi+1), and Out1sˆi stands for the set of states in h−(sˆi) with outputting edges
to the states in Out0
sˆi
, and Out2
sˆi
means the set of states in h−(sˆi) with outputting
edges to the states in Out1
sˆi
, and so on. Thus, Outsˆi denotes the set of states in
h−(sˆi) from which some state in h−( ˆsi+1) are reachable as depicted in the higher
gray part in Fig. 4. Similar to Insˆi , there must exist a natural number n, such that
n+1⋃
i=0
Outi
sˆi
=
n⋃
i=0
Outi
sˆi
. Note that for the last state sˆn in a finite counterexample,
Out0
sˆn
= {s | s ∈ h−(sˆn) ∩ F}
Out1
sˆn
= {s | s ∈ h−(sˆn), s′ ∈ Out0sˆn, and (s, s′) ∈ R}
...
where F is the set of states without any successors in the original model.
Accordingly, a failure state can be defined as follows.
Definition 1. (Failure States) A state sˆi in a counterexample ˆΠ is a failure state
if, and only if Insˆi ∩ Outsˆi = ∅. 
Further, given a failure state sˆi in a counterexample ˆΠ, the set of the origins of
sˆi, h−(sˆi), is separated into three sets, D = Insˆi (the set of dead states), B = Outsˆi
(the set of bad states) and I = h−(sˆi) \ (D∪B) (the set of the isolated states).
Definition 2. (Spurious Counterexamples) A counterexample ˆΠ in an abstract
model ˆK is spurious if there exists at least one failure state sˆi in ˆΠ 
Example 2. Fig. 5 shows a spurious counterexample where state ˆ2 is a failure
state.
In the set, h−(ˆ2) = {7, 8, 9}, of the origins of state ˆ2, 9 is a dead state, 7 is a bad
state, and 8 is an isolated state. 
5. Algorithms for Detecting Spurious Counterexamples
Based on the formal definition of spurious counterexample, new algorithms
for checking whether or not a counterexample is spurious are presented in this
section.
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Figure 5: A Spurious Path
5.1. Algorithm by Detecting the First Failure State
Algorithm CheckSpurious-I takes a counterexample as input and outputs the
first failure state in the counterexample. Note that a counterexample may be a
finite path < s0, s1, ..., sn >, n ≥ 0, or an infinite path < s0, s1, ..., (si, ..., s j)ω >,
0 ≤ i ≤ j, with a loop suffix (a suffix produced by a loop). For the finite one,
it can be checked directly; while for an infinite one, we need only to check its
Complete Finite Prefix (CFP) < s0, s1, ..., si, ..., s j > since whether or not a state si
is a failure state only relies on its pre and post states. It is pointed out that in the
CFP < s0, s1, ..., si, ..., s j > of an infinite counterexample,
Out0
sˆ j = {s | s ∈ h
−(sˆ j), s′ ∈ h−(sˆi) and (s, s′) ∈ R}
Out1sˆ j = {s | s ∈ h
−(sˆ j), s′ ∈ Out0sˆ j and (s, s′) ∈ R}
...
since the post state of sˆ j is sˆi.
Algorithm 1 : CheckSpurious-I( ˆΠ)
Input: a counterexample ˆΠ =< sˆ0, sˆ1, ..., sˆn > in the abstract model ˆK =
( ˆS , ˆS 0, ˆR, ˆL), and the original model K = (S , S 0,R, L)
Output: a failure state s f
1: Initialization: int i = 0;
2: while i ≤ n do
3: if Insˆi ∩ Outsˆi , ∅, i = i + 1;
4: else return s f = sˆi; break;
5: end while
6: if i == n + 1, return ˆΠ is a real counterexample;
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Algorithm Analyzing. In algorithm CheckSpurious-I, to check whether or not a
state sˆi is a failure state only relies on sˆi’s pre and post states, ˆsi−1 and ˆsi+1; while in
algorithm SplitPath, to check state sˆi is up to the prefix, sˆ0, ..., ˆsi−1, of sˆi. Based on
this, to check a periodic infinite counterexample, several repetitions of the periodic
parts are needed in SplitPath. In contrast, this can be easily done by checking
the complete finite prefix < s1, s2, ..., si, ..., s j > in algorithm CheckSpurious-I.
Thus, the polynomial number of unwinding of the loop can be avoided. That is
for infinite counterexamples, the finite prefix to be checked will be polynomial
shorter than the one in algorithm SplitPath.
5.2. Algorithm by Detecting the Heaviest Failure State
In algorithm SplitPath and CheckSpurious-I, always, the first failure state is
detected. Then further refinement will be done based on the analysis of this failure
state. Possibly, several failure states may occur in one counterexample, so which
Algorithm 2 : CheckSpurious-II( ˆΠ)
Input: a counterexample ˆΠ =< sˆ0, sˆ1, ..., sˆn > in the abstract model ˆK =
( ˆS , ˆS 0, ˆR, ˆL), and the original model K = (S , S 0,R, L)
Output: the heaviest failure state s f
1: Sorting: the heavier the earlier (stored in array int w[n + 1]);
2: Initialization: int i = 0;
3: while i ≤ n do
4: if In
ˆsw[i] ∩ Out ˆsw[i] , ∅, i = i + 1;
5: else return s f = ˆsw[i]; break;
6: end while
7: if i == n + 1, return ˆΠ is a real counterexample;
one is chosen to be refined is not considered in SplitPath. Obviously, if a failure
state shared by more paths is refined, a number of model checking iterations will
be saved in the whole abstract-refinement loop. With this consideration, we will
check the states which is shared by more paths first. To do so, for an abstract
state sˆ as illustrated in Fig.6, EIn(sˆ) and EOut(sˆ) are defined. EIn(sˆ) equals to the
number of edges connecting to the states in h−(sˆ) from the states outside of h−(sˆ);
and EOut(sˆ) is the number of edges connecting to the states out of h−(sˆ) from the
states in h−(sˆ). Accordingly, EIn(sˆ) × EOut(sˆ) is the number of the paths where sˆ
occurs. For convenience, we call EIn(sˆ)×EOut(sˆ) the weight of the abstract state
sˆ. Based on this, algorithm CheckSpurious-II is given for detecting the heaviest
9
sˆEIn EOut
Figure 6: In and out edges
failure state in a counterexample. In CheckSpurious-II, an array w[i] is used to
store the indexes of the states in the counterexample by the heavier the earlier.
5.3. Parallel Algorithms
Considering whether or not a state sˆi is a failure state only relies on the pre-
and post- states, ˆsi−1 and ˆsi+1, of sˆi, the algorithm can be naturally paralleled as
presented in algorithm CheckSpurious-III and CheckSpurious-IV.
In CheckSpurious-III, anytime, if a failure state is detected by a processor, all
the processors will be stop and the failure state is returned. Otherwise, if no failure
states are reported, the counterexample is a real one. That is the algorithm always
reports the first detected failure state obtained by the processors. Note that a
boolean array c[n] is used to indicate whether or not a state in the counterexample
is a failure one. Initially, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n, c[i] is undefined (c[i] = ⊥). c[i] == true
means state sˆi is not a failure state.
Algorithm 3 : CheckSpurious-III( ˆΠ)
Input: a counterexample ˆΠ =< sˆ0, sˆ1, ..., sˆn > in the abstract model ˆK =
( ˆS , ˆS 0, ˆR, ˆL), and the original model K = (S , S 0,R, L) in shared memory
n: the number of processors
k: processor id
Output: a failure state s f
1: Initialization: bool c[n + 1] = {⊥, ...,⊥};
2: for k = 0 to n do in parallel do
3: if Insˆk ∩ Outsˆk , ∅, c[k] = ture;
4: else return s f = sˆk; stop all processors;
5: end for
6: if for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n, c[i] == ture, return ˆΠ is a real counterexample;
In CheckSpurious-IV, the weight of the states are considered, and always the
heaviest failure state is found.
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Algorithm 4 : CheckSpurious-IV( ˆΠ)
Input: a counterexample ˆΠ =< sˆ0, sˆ1, ..., sˆn > in the abstract model ˆK =
( ˆS , ˆS 0, ˆR, ˆL), and the original model K = (S , S 0,R, L) in shared memory
n: the number of processors
k: processor id
Output: a failure state s f
1: Sorting: the heavier state first (stored in array int w[n + 1]);
2: for k = 0 to n do in parallel do
3: if Insˆk ∩ Outsˆk , ∅, c[k] = ture;
4: else return c[k] = f alse;
5: end for
6: if for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, c[i] = ture, return ˆΠ is a real counterexample;
7: else return s f = si such that c[i] == f alse, and for any state sˆ j, if the weight
of sˆ j is heavier than sˆi, c[ j] == true;
6. Conclusion
Based on a formal definition of spurious paths, a novel approach for detect-
ing spurious counterexamples are presented in this paper. In the new approach,
whether or not a state sˆi is a failure state only relies on sˆi’s pre- and post- states
in the counterexample. So, for infinite counterexample, the polynomial number
of unwinding of the loop can be avoided. Further, the algorithm can be easily
improved by detecting the heaviest failure state such that a number of model
checking iterations can be saved in the whole abstract-refinement loop. Also,
the algorithm can be naturally parallelled.
The presented algorithms are useful in improving the abstract based model
checking, especially the counterexample guided abstraction refinement model check-
ing. In the near future, the proposed algorithm will be implemented and integrated
into the tool CEGAR. Further, some case studies will be conducted to evaluate the
algorithms.
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